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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BATH IRON WORKS CORP. et al. v. DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the first circuit
No. 91-871.   Argued November 4, 1992-Decided January 12, 1993

Upon learning after he retired that he suffered from a work-related
 hearing loss, respondent Brown, a former employee of petitioner Bath
 Iron Works Corp., filed a timely claim for disability benefits under
 the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.  In calcu-
 lating Brown's benefits, the Administrative Law Judge applied a
 hybrid of the compensation systems set forth in 8(c)(13) and
 8(c)(23) of that Act, and the Benefits Review Board affirmed.  Reject-
 ing the Board's reliance on 8(c)(23), the Court of Appeals held that
 hearing loss claims, whether filed by current workers or retirees,
 must be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(13).  Under that section, a
 claimant who has suffered a disabling injury of a kind specifically
 identified in a schedule, including hearing loss, is entitled to certain
 benefits regardless of whether his earning capacity had actually been
 impaired.  In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
 Eleventh Circuits have held that a retiree's claim for occupational
 hearing loss should be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(23).  Under
 that section, a retiree who suffers from an occupational disease that
 did not become disabling until after retirement-one ``which does not
 immediately result in death or disability'' in the words of the
 Act-receives certain benefits based on the ``time of injury,'' which is
 defined as the date on which the claimant becomes aware, or reason-
 ably should have been aware, of the relationship between the employ-
 ment, the disease, and the disability.  In Brown's case, as in most
 cases, 8(c)(13) benefits would be more generous than 8(c)(23)
 benefits.
Held:Claims for hearing loss, whether filed by current workers or
 retirees, are claims for a scheduled injury and must be compensated
 under 8(c)(13), not 8(c)(23).  Respondent Director's undisputed
 characterization of occupational hearing loss as a condition that does
 cause immediate disability must be accepted.  A worker who is
 exposed to excessive noise suffers the injury of such loss, which, as
 a scheduled injury, is presumptively disabling, simultaneously with
 that exposure.  Thus, the loss cannot be compensated under 8(c)(23)
 as ``an occupational disease which does not immediately result in . . .
 disability.''  In holding that claims for occupational hearing loss
 should be compensated pursuant to 8(c)(23), the Eleventh and Fifth
 Circuits have essentially read this key phrase out of the statute.  To
 the extent there is any unfairness in the statutory scheme in that
 employers may be held liable for postretirement increases in hearing
 loss due to aging, they can protect themselves by giving employees
 audiograms at the time of retirement and thereby freezing the
 amount of compensable hearing loss.  A lone Senator's single passing
 remark in the legislative history does not persuade this Court that
 retirees' hearing loss claims should be compensated under 8(c)(23).
 Pp.10-14.
942 F.2d 811, affirmed.

 Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.